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Admiralty
by Colin A. McRae*
Edgar M. Smith*
and Kate C. Lawson***
I. APPELLATE ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
In Wajnstat v. Oceania Cruises, Inc.,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the decision of the United
State District Court for the Southern District of Florida denying the
cruise line's motion for partial summary judgment and granting the
injured passenger's motion for partial summary judgment as to the
cruise line's limitation of liability defense.2 Wajnstat was a passenger
on board the Oceania cruise ship who became ill and required medical
attention during a cruise from Istanbul, Turkey to Athens, Greece. After
several surgeries, Wajnstat filed suit claiming that "Oceania negligently
hired, retained, and supervised the ship's doctor."3 Oceania raised as
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1. 684 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 2012).
2. Id. at 1154-55.
3. Id.
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an affirmative defense the limitation of liability provisions of the Athens
Convention,4 as referenced in the cruise ticket contract.5
Ruling on cross motions for summary judgment as to the reasonableness of the limitation of liability provision, the district court concluded
that the limitation of liability provision was unenforceable, and Oceania
appealed.6 The Eleventh Circuit never reached the issue of the Athens
Convention and the enforceability of the limitation of liability provision.7 Although both parties consented to the Eleventh Circuit's
appellate jurisdiction, the court disagreed and dismissed the appeal.8
The general rule is that "final judgments of a district court are
appealable to the United States Courts of Appeals, whereas interlocutory
orders are not."9 However, "[iun admiralty cases .. .we have jurisdic-

tion over interlocutory appeals 'determining the rights and liabilities of
the parties'" under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3).'0 Relying on a prior United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit opinion," the Eleventh
Circuit held the following:
If, as Ford Motor Co. held, a district court does not determine the
"rights and liabilities of the parties" when it decides the applicability
of a statutory limitation of liability, it also does not determine "the
rights and liabilities of the parties" when it determines the applicability of a contractual limitation of liability. 2
The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction."3

4. Id. at 1154, 1155 n.2 ("The Athens Convention is a multilateral treaty, which for
the purposes of Oceania's ticket contract consists of the Athens Convention Relating to the
Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea, Dec. 13, 1974, 1463 U.N.T.S. 19, and
the Protocol to the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their
Luggage by Sea, Nov. 19, 1976, 1545 U.N.T.S. 339. The United States is not a party to the
Athens Convention. Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 837 (9th Cir. 2002).").
5. Id. at 1154-55.
6. Id. at 1155.
7. Id. at 1155-57.
8. Id. at 1157.
9. Birmingham Fire Fighters Ass'n 117 v. City of Birmingham, 603 F.3d 1248, 1254
(11th Cir. 2010).
10. Wajnstat, 684 F.3d at 1155; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(aX3) (2006).
11. Ford Motor Co. v. S.S. Santa Irene, 341 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1965).
12. Wajnstat, 684 F.3d at 1155.
13. Id. at 1157. Oceania also argued that the Eleventh Circuit had jurisdiction
unrelated to the admiralty jurisdiction provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3). Wajnstat, 684
F.3d at 1156. However, the Eleventh Circuit also denied jurisdiction under the collateral
order rule. IA at 1156-57.
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II. SEAFARER ARBITRATION CLAUSES
After a busy slate of arbitration clause-related appeals in 2011, the
Eleventh Circuit continues to hear appeals on the enforceability of
seafarers' arbitration clauses, even post Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas),
Ltd.,14 and Bautista v. Star Cruises." In a new case similar to Lindo
and the many before it, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida's order compelling
arbitration of a Carnival employee's complaint for failure to provide
medical care. 6 Kenneth Fernandes sued his employer, Carnival Corp.,
in Florida state court. Carnival removed the case to federal court and
moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the Seafarer's Agreement
signed by Fernandes upon his employment. Fernandes then appealed
the district court's order compelling arbitration.'
The crew member plaintiff, relying on the Eleventh Circuit's Thomas
v. Carnival Corp.'" opinion from 2009, argued that the arbitration
provision was invalid as against public policy.' 9 However, the Eleventh
Circuit has held that the only defenses available to enforcement of an
arbitration provision are, "fraud, mistake, duress, and waiver."2'
Further, the Eleventh Circuit "also rejected Plaintiff's argument about
Thomas: 'to the extent Thomas allowed the plaintiff seaman to prevail
on a new public policy defense under [the Convention], 2 ' Thomas
violates Bautista and our prior panel precedent rule.'"2 2 The Eleventh
Circuit further ruled that the plaintiffs Jones Act and maintenance and
cure claims were subject to arbitration as those claims arose as a result
of his employment.2"
Prior to Fernandes,the Eleventh Circuit addressed another arbitration
provision in Arauz v. Carnival Corp.' Arauz is worth discussing in
this Survey, but its substantive principles do not require extensive
review due to the procedural posture and timing of the appeal. The

14. 652 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2011).
15. 396 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005).
16. Fernandes v. Carnival Corp., 484 F. App'x 361, 362 (11th Cir. 2012).
17. Id.
18. 573 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2009).
19. Fernandes,484 F. App'x at 362.
20. Id. (quoting Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1273).
21. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, tit. 9, ch. 2.
22. Fernandes,484 F. App'x at 362 (quoting Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1278) (alteration in
original).
23. Id. at 363.
24. 466 F. App'x 815 (11th Cir. 2012).
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Eleventh Circuit decided Lindo while the Arauz appeal was pending.2 5
In addressing the appeal, Arauz essentially acknowledged that Lindo
foreclosed his public policy argument. 26 Further, Arauz acknowledged
that the Eleventh Circuit panel could not overrule Lindo" As such,
the Eleventh Circuit held
"Lindo requires us to affirm the order
28
compelling arbitration."

III. CRUISE SHIP'S DUTY TO WARN
In Chaparro v.Carnival Corp.,29 the Eleventh Circuit reversed the
Southern District of Florida's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(F.R.C.P.). 3 ° The district court had dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint
despite a very unfortunate fact pattern. While the Carnival cruise ship
M/V VICTORY was in port at St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, a Carnival
employee recommended the Chaparro family visit a local beach. After
visiting the local beach, the family was caught in a gang-related shooting
during which one member of the family was struck by a bullet and
killed. The family sued Carnival under a failure to warn theory, but the
district court granted Carnival's motion to dismiss pursuant to F.R.C.P.
31
12(b)(6).
In order to analyze whether the appellants had satisfied the pleading
standard, the Eleventh Circuit first had to determine whether Carnival
actually "has a duty to warn passengers of known dangers at ports of
call."3 2 The court began by acknowledging that a maritime negligence
case relies on the general principles of negligence law.33 In order to
sufficiently plead negligence, both maritime and non-maritime plaintiffs
must "allege that (1) the defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff
from a particular injury; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the
breach actually and proximately caused the plaintiffs injury; and (4) the
plaintiff suffered actual harm."' The Eleventh Circuit went on to
define the duty in a maritime context as, "'reasonable care under the
circumstances,a standard which requires, as a prerequisite to imposing

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 817.
Id.
Id.
Id.
693 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1333; FED. R. Civ. P. 12.
Chaparro, 693 F.3d at 1335.
Id.
Id. at 1336.
Id.
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liability, that the carrier have had actual or constructive notice of the
risk-creating condition, at least where.. . the menace is one commonly
encountered on land and not clearly linked to nautical adventure."'35
The Eleventh Circuit also cited a non-binding Florida immediate
appellate court decision where the state court held "a cruise line owes its
passengers a duty to warn of known dangers beyond the point of
debarkation in places where passengers are invited or reasonably
expected to visit."36 Based upon the defined duty, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the appellants' allegations in the complaint-"that
Carnival was aware of gang-related violence and crime, including public
shootings, in St. Thomas generally and near Coki Beach specifically"-were sufficiently pled.3"
IV.

FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES IN CRUISE SHIP TICKETS

In Estate of Myhra v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.," the Eleventh
Circuit reviewed the dismissal of a personal injury matter based on a
forum selection clause contained in a cruise ticket. 39 The complaint
was filed by the estate of Royal Caribbean passenger Tore Myhra, a
resident of England, who fell ill and died while onboard a Royal
Caribbean vessel. After Myhra passed away, his estate filed suit against
Royal Caribbean in the Southern District of Florida. Royal Caribbean
moved to dismiss the complaint based upon improper venue under
F.R.C.P. 12(bX3). Royal Caribbean's basis for its motion to dismiss was
the forum selection clause included in the ticket contract, which required
that all personal injury claims be litigated in the courts of England and
Wales, and be governed by English law.4 ° The district court dismissed
the complaint and the passenger's estate appealed arguing that the
forum selection clause should be invalidated for two reasons: (1) it is
against the statutorily expressed policy of the United States; and (2) its
terms were not reasonably communicated to the Myhras.4'
The deceased passenger's wife booked the cruise through an English
travel agency. The terms and conditions of the contract were provided
to the passengers both in an invoice from the travel agency and in the

35. Id. (quoting Keefe v. Bahamas Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir.
1989)).
36. Id. (citing Carlisle v. Ulysses Line, Ltd., 475 So. 2d 248, 251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985)).
37. Id.
38. 695 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2012).
39. Id. at 1235.
40. Id. at 1235-37.
41. Id. at 1236.
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travel documents provided by Royal Caribbean.42 The terms and
conditions limited Royal Caribbean's liability pursuant to the Athens
Convention. 43 The travel documents expressly provided, "'We both
agree that any dispute, claim or other matter arising out of or in
connection with your contract or your holiday with us will only be dealt
with by the Courts of England and Wales."' On appeal, the Myhra
estate pointed to 46 U.S.C. § 30509(a), 4 and argued that the forum
selection clause should not be enforced by federal courts as it is against
the public policy of the United States. 4' The Eleventh Circuit pointed
to the express language of the statute, which expressly prohibits
limitations on liability in certain situations but does not prohibit the use
of a forum selection clause.4' The passenger's estate argued that the
ticket contract essentially limits the liability of any injured parties by
including a forum selection clause."' After in-depth analysis, the
Eleventh Circuit returned to the plain language of the statute, and
"think[s] the appropriate course is to interpret the statute to its plain
language unless Congress, by appropriate amendment, makes policy
choices on the contours of choice-of-forum clauses that involve the
Country's international commercial relationships." '
The court of
appeals ruled that 46 U.S.C. § 30509(a) did not prohibit the forumselection clause at issue.5 0
The Myhra estate next argued that the forum selection clause should
be invalidated because it was "achieved by overreaching."5 ' The
Eleventh Circuit addressed fraud and overreaching in the non-negotiated

42. Id. at 1237.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 46 U.S.C. § 30509(a) (2006). The statute reads in full as follows:
(a) PROHIBITION.(1) IN GENERAL-The owner, master, manager, or agent of a vessel transporting
passengers between ports in the United States, or between a port in the United
States and a port in a foreign country, may not include in a regulation or contract
a provision limiting(A) the liability of the owner, master, or agent for personal injury or death caused
by the negligence or fault of the owner or the owner's employees or agents; or
(B) the right of a claimant for personal injury or death to a trial by court of
competent jurisdiction.
(2) VOIDNEss.-A provision described in paragraph (1) is void.

Id.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1241.
Id. at 1242.
Id.
Id. at 1244.
Id.; see also 46 U.S.C. § 30509.
Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1244.
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forum selection clause context by applying the "useful two-part test of
'reasonable communicativeness' [which] takes into account the clause's
physical characteristics and whether the plaintiffs had the ability to
become meaningfully informed of the clause and to reject its terms."52
First, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the clause's physical characteristics. 53 The court analyzed the travel documents provided to the
passengers and determined that'the type-face was legible and that the
pertinent sections were under "clear, plain-English headings." 4
Further, the Eleventh Circuit considered the five separate invoices
forwarded to the passengers, each of which contained a notice directing
passengers to the terms and conditions available at a specific web
address.5 5 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that "the physical characteristics of the warning in this case were sufficient to reasonably communicate the forum-selection clause to the [appellants]. " 56
Next, the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether the passengers "'had
the ability to become meaningfully informed of the clause and to reject
its terms.' ' 57 The Eleventh Circuit noted the five separate invoices, the
extensive travel documents, and the clear unambiguous reference to the
courts of England and Wales as evidence that the appellants had the
ability to become meaningfully informed.5" As such, the Eleventh
Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of the complaint under
F.R.C.P. 12(b)(3).5 9
V.

CONTRACTUAL STATUTE OF LIMITATION IN CRUISE SHIP TICKETS

In an unpublished opinion, Farris v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., ° the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of a cruise line
based upon its contractual limitations period."' Passenger Deanna
Farris was injured in May 2009 while on board a Celebrity cruise vessel.
Farris brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida in April 2011, seeking damages for injuries sustained

52.
2009)).
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. (quoting Krenkel v. Kerzner Int'l Hotels Ltd., 579 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir.
Id. at 1244-45.
Id. at 1245.
Id.
Id. at 1246.
Id. (quoting Krenkel, 579 F.3d at 1281).
Id.
Id. at 1247.
487 F. App'x 542 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 544.
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during her 2009 cruise. The cruise line moved for summary judgment,
relying on the language of its cruise ticket contract.6 2
A paragraph in the ticket contract entitled, "NOTICE OF CLAIMS
AND COMMENCEMENT OF SUIT OR ARBITRATION, SECURITY,"
contained a provision limiting the time period to file suit to one year.
The ticket also provided that the cruise line was entitled to the
protections available under the Athens Convention."
Farris argued that 46 U.S.C. § 30508(b)(2)65 forbids parties from
contractually shortening a limitations period from the three-year statute
for maritime torts prescribed in 46 U.S.C. § 30106.66 The Eleventh
Circuit was not persuaded because Farris entirely misread the statute
upon which she relied. 6' The Eleventh Circuit discussed the statute:
Congress has precluded the owner of a "vessel transporting passengers
... between ports in the United States, or between a port in the

United States and a port in a foreign country" from contracting for a
limitations period for maritime personal
injury claims that is "less than
"
one year after the date of the injury. "
The Eleventh Circuit held that the plain language of the statute allowed
the cruise line to do just as it had done in shortening the limitations
period to one year.6 9 Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit summarily held
that pursuant to the plain language of the ticket contract, the limitations period under the Athens Convention only benefitted the cruise
line. °
VI. MARITIME PERSONAL INJURY
A 2012 Eleventh Circuit decision worth noting is Rosenfeld v. Oceania
Cruises, Inc.7 ' This reported opinion is particularly interesting in that
the opinion itself consists of a one-paragraph Order Denying Rehearing
En Banc, which is followed by a twenty-one page dissenting opinion by
Judge Gerald Tjoflat.7 2 The underlying case involved a personal injury
suffered by a passenger onboard a cruise line. At trial, the plaintiff

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 543.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 543 & n.1.
46 U.S.C. § 30508(b)(2) (2006).
Farris,487 F. App'x at 544; see also 46 U.S.C. § 30106 (2006).
Farris,487 F. App'x at 544.
Id.; see also 46 U.S.C. § 30508(b)(2).
Farris,487 F. App'x at 544.
Id.
682 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1321 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
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proffered expert testimony regarding the floor on which she slipped and
fell.7 ' As Judge Tjoflat bemoaned, "[p]resumably" the district court
sustained Oceania's objection to introduction of that testimony, as no
trial transcript was included as part of the record on appeal. 4 Judge
Tjoflat devoted many paragraphs to the importance of pretrial rulings
versus trial rulings. Judge Tjoflat's conclusion shows the importance he
placed on this dissent:
Writing this dissenting opinion has been a very distasteful undertaking. I have written it because I am concerned about the integrity of the
court as an institution. Rule 35 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure
declares that an "en banc ...rehearing is not favored and ordinarily
will not be ordered unless: (1) en banc consideration is necessary to
secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or (2) the
proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance." A routine
"slip and fall" case ordinarily does not present a question of exceptional
importance. But en banc consideration of this "slip and fall" case
became necessary when the panel refused to grant rehearing. Surely,
maintaining the integrity of the court's decision making process is a
matter of exceptional importance. 5
VII. MARITIME ATTACHMENT
In an unpublished opinion, Adams Offshore, Ltd. v. Blake Marine
Group,6 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Alabama allocating attachment costs amongst several parties.7 7 Plaintiff Adams Offshore, Ltd.
(Adams) filed an action in the district court seeking attachment of a
diving system owned by one of its debtors. Adams claimed damages of
$7 million, while Blake Marine Group (Blake Marine) intervened
claiming damages of $60,647,834, and Cashman Equipment Corporation
(Cashman) intervened claiming damages of $1.7 million. The district
court vacated its attachment order after Adams had incurred attachment
costs of $235,957.96. The district court apportioned the costs amongst
Adams, Blake Marine, and Cashman based upon the relative value of
each party's claim for damages. Adams was ordered to absorb 10% of
the costs, Blake Marine was ordered to reimburse Adams for 87.5% of

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1341 (citations omitted); see also FED. R. App. P. 35(a)(1)-(2). While the
dissenting opinion of Judge Tjoflat is not binding on the district courts of the Eleventh
Circuit, its reasoning is worth review by the practitioners in the circuit.
76. 478 F. App'x 558 (11th Cir. 2012).
77. Id. at 560.
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the costs,
and Cashman was ordered to reimburse Adams for 2.5% of the
78
costs.

Blake Marine appealed, arguing that the costs should not have been
allocated amongst the parties at all, and in the alternative, that the
allocation should not have been based upon the relative value of the
claims. Blake Marine's position was that only reasonable costs should
be allocated, and that the costs allocated by the district court were not
reasonable.7 9 The Eleventh Circuit noted that it "review[s] only for
clear error factfindings made by the district court sitting in admiralty
jurisdiction without a jury."' ° As to Blake Marine's second argument
the allocation method was improper, the Eleventh Circuit relied upon
the local rules of the district.8 ' First, the Eleventh Circuit "'give[s]
82
great deference to a district court's interpretation of its local rules.'
The local rule at issue provides the following: "'Intervenors under this
rule shall be liable for costs together with the party originally effecting
seizure on any reasonable basis determined by the court.' 8 " Because
the Eleventh Circuit relies upon the district court's interpretation of its
own local rules, the only issue for the Eleventh Circuit to determine is,
"whether the court's
method of allocating the attachment costs had a
'reasonable basis."' 4 The Eleventh Circuit cited to the Fifth Circuit
and the Model Local Admiralty Rules in affirming the district court's
allocation method. 5 Interestingly enough, it was Blake Marine who
had brought the Model Rules to the district court's attention, including
the provision that provides allocation of attachment costs "'in the
proportion
that the intervenor's claim bears to the sum of all the
86
claims.'
VIII.

LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT

In Boroski v. DynCorp International,7 the Eleventh Circuit faced a
case on remand from the United States Supreme Court.88 While the

78. Id. at 559.
79. Id. at 559-60.
80. Id. at 559.
81. Id. at 560.
82. Id. (quoting Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1282 (11th Cir. 2011)).
83. Id.; see also S.D. Ala. Loc. Adm. R. 6(c).
84. Adams Offshore, Ltd., 478 F. App'x at 560; see also S.D. Ala. Loc. Adm. R. 6(c).
85. Adams Offshore, Ltd., 478 F. App'x at 560; see Beauregard, Inc. v. Sword Servs.
LLC, 107 F.3d 351, 353 n.8 (5th Cir. 1997).
86. Adams Offshore, Ltd., 478 F. App'x at 560; see also MODEL LOC. ADM. R. E(11)(b)
(2008).
87. 700 F.3d 446 (11th Cir. 2012).
88. Id. at 447.

20131

ADMIRALTY

839

underlying facts of the case are not maritime in nature, the case deals
with an interpretation of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (the Act), 9 as extended by the Defense Base Act.9" The
amount of each payment made under the Act is determined in reference
to the national average weekly wage, which is calculated each year, so
the amount of a disabled employee's benefit payment depends on which
year's national average weekly wage is used to calculate that payment.91 Section 906(c) of the Act provides that determinations of the
national average weekly wage apply to employees or survivors "currently
receiving compensation for permanent total disability or death benefits
during such period," along with those "newly awarded compensation
during such period."9 2
Bernard Boroski (Boroski) applied for workers' compensation benefits
under the Act, which applied to him by virtue of the Defense Base Act
after exposure to various chemicals left him legally blind in both eyes.
He has been permanently disabled since April 20, 2002, when he stopped
work.9 3 When the case first appeared in the Eleventh Circuit, on appeal
from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida,
Boroski argued that the phrase, "newly awarded compensation" in
§ 906(c) means the actual entry of a compensation award.9 4 The
Eleventh Circuit agreed with that interpretation; however, after the
Eleventh Circuit handed down its opinion in Boroski I, the Supreme
Court held in Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc.,9 that "'newly awarded
compensation'" means newly entitled to compensation, or "statutorily
entitled to compensation because of disability."96 Therefore, the date on
which the employee's disability occurs determines the maximum weekly
rate of compensation for a permanently and totally disabled employee
who is "newly awarded compensation."9 7 On remand, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that the compensation
rate applicable to Boroski was determined by reference to the date when
his benefits became payable, April 20, 2002.98

89.

33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2006). The Act provides disability benefits to covered

employees, and sets maximum and minimum benefit payments. 33 U.S.C. § 906(b).
90. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651-55 (2006); Boroski, 700 F.3d at 447.
91. Boroski, 700 F.3d at 447.
92. Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 906(c).
93. Boroski v. Dyncorp Int'l, 662 F.3d 1197, 1198 (11th Cir. 2011) (Boroski I).
94. Boroski, 700 F.3d at 448.
95. 132 S. Ct. 1350 (2012).
96. Boroski, 700 F.3d at 448 (quoting Roberts, 132 S. Ct. at 1357).
97. Id. at 452-53.
98. Id. at 453.
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The Eleventh Circuit then considered Boroski's second argument, an
issue which the Supreme Court did not address in Roberts.99 This
argument deals with the "currently receiving compensation" language of
§ 906(c).'0° Boroski argued that "currently receiving" compensation
means actually physically receiving the payments, and does not mean
that the employee is currently entitled to the payments.' He argued
that under the Act there is not a problem in interpreting the two clauses
differently because the Act sets up two compensation schemes. According
to Boroski, the "currently receiving" clause is expressly limited to those
who are permanently and totally disabled, and the "newly awarded"
clause is not so limited. Boroski's argument, then, would allow those who
are not totally and permanently disabled to have their benefits
determined according to the year they become entitled to them, and
allow those who are totally and permanently disabled to have their
benefits0 2 determined according to the time they actually receive
them. 1

The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, and held that "currently receiving
compensation" means "currently entitled to compensation."' 3 The court
found the "newly awarded" clause does not exclude "totally and
permanently disabled" employees from its reach: every person entitled
to benefits under the Act is "newly awarded" benefits at some point.1 0
Boroski's interpretation of § 906(c) would lead to a conflict between the
two clauses. 10 5 Instead, by interpreting "currently receiving" to mean
"currently entitled to," the two clauses result in only one benefit
payment amount for a claimant's first year of disability.0 6 The court
also found that Boroski's interpretation of the "currently receiving"
clause was inconsistent with § 910(f) of the Act, which provides for
annual increases in benefit payments to persons who are totally and
permanently disabled.' 7 Boroski's interpretation would also lead to
disparate treatment of similarly situated claimants.' 8 Two people
permanently disabled on the same day could receive different amounts,

99. Id. at 449.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 449-50 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 450.
103. Id. at 451.
104. Id.
105. Id. The court pointed out that, by interpreting each clause differently, the two
clauses could direct two different payment amounts for the employee's first year of
disability. Id.
106. Id. at 452.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 453.

ADMIRALTY

2013]

depending on when they actually began receiving compensation. 10 9
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held that "currently receiving compensation" in
33 U.S.C. § 906(c) means "currently entitled to compensa0
tion."
IX.

SEAMAN STATUS UNDER THE JoNEs ACT

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals took the opportunity in Clark
v. American Marine & Salvage, LLC" l to clarify the parameters for a
plaintiff to qualify as a "seaman" under the Jones Act." 2 William
Clark was an employee of American Marine & Salvage, LLC, a Mobilebased vessel repair contractor. His duties with the company included
responding to business calls, preparing invoices and operating the office,
as well as diving, welding and repair work. A diary Clark kept between
January 1 and May 15, 2010, recorded 159 hours of vessel repair work
out of his 768.5 total hours of work for American Marine. That diary
also recorded three separate injuries sustained during repair work,
including an elbow injury and two back injuries."' He filed suit
against American Marine for unseaworthiness and maintenance and
cure under the general maritime law, and negligence under the Jones
Act. American Marine successfully argued that Clark did not qualify as
a seaman under the Jones Act because he had not worked a substantial
amount of time in the service of a vessel in navigation, and the district
court granted summary judgment."'
The court of appeals applied the criteria from the landmark United
States Supreme Court case of Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis"6 in affirming
the district court's grant of summary judgment."' The court began by
setting forth the two-part test from Chandris for determining whether
a marine employee qualifies as a seaman under the Jones Act, which
requires that the employee's duties "contribute to the function of the
vessel," and that the individual employee "ha[s] a connection to a vessel
in navigation.., that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its
nature."" 7 The court went on to cite the "general rule" from Chandris
that "an employee 'who spends less than about 30 percent of his time in

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
494 F. App'x 32 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 32; 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
Clark, 494 F. App'x at 32-33.
Id. at 33-34.
515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995).
Clark, 494 F. App'x at 34-35.
Id. at 34 (quoting Chandris,515 U.S. at 368).
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the service
of a vessel in navigation should not qualify as a sea118
man.
In applying these criteria to Clark's situation, the court of appeals
agreed with the district court's conclusion that Clark had failed to
introduce sufficient evidence that his work was substantially connected
to a vessel in navigation." 9 Significant amongst the factors considered
in reaching this conclusion were that Clark's repair hours never took
him to sea, nor exposed him to the perils of the sea; he never performed
repair work while a vessel was in navigation; his repairs from the
American Marine repair barge were mostly performed while the barge's
bottom was resting on land; and even while cutting and welding, his
leads and torch were at all times tethered to welding machinery located
in his landside utility trailer. 2 ° Furthermore, 159 hours of dockside
repair work (out of 768.5 total hours) did not reach the threshold 30%
figure set forth in Chandris.'2' The grant of summary judgment was
therefore affirmed.'22
X.

MARITIME JURISDICTION

The case of United States v. Pena 2 3 presented the Eleventh Circuit,
as an issue of first impression in any federal circuit court of appeals, the
question of whether federal courts have jurisdiction to prosecute offenses
under the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships 24 (commonly named MARPOL) committed by United Statesbased MARPOL surveyors during their inspection of foreign-flagged
vessels in the United States.'25 Hugo Pena was a Fort Lauderdalebased surveyor nominated by the vessel's classification society 116 to
conduct a MARPOL survey onboard the Motor Vessel ISLAND EXPRESS I on behalf of the nation of Panama in connection with the
vessel's change of flag from St. Kitts and Nevis to Panama.'2 7 Pena
conducted the survey and issued a certificate on April 15, 2010,

118. Id. (quoting Chandris, 515 U.S. at 371).
119. Id. at 33.
120. Id. at 34-35.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 35.
123. 684 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2012).
124. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL),
International Maritime Organization, httpJ/www.imo.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
125. Pena, 684 F.3d at 1141.
126. A vessel's "classification society" is an organization that inspects vessels and issues
certificates on behalf of a vessel's flag state. Id. at 1142-43.
127. Id. at 1143.
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confirming that the vessel's structure, equipment, systems, and other
components complied with MARPOL."28
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) conducted an unannounced
port state control inspection of the ISLAND EXPRESS I at a port near
Fort Lauderdale on May 4, 2010, and found the vessel to be significantly
out of compliance with MARPOL. In particular, the vessel's oil pollution
prevention equipment was found to be inoperable and there was no bilge
tank space for storing dirty bilge water pending disposal ashore. In its
place, the USCG discovered a makeshift system of pumps and rubber
tubes connecting the ship's bilge directly to the main deck of the vessel,
where the bilge water could be discharged directly over the side of the
ship without being filtered or run through oily water separator
equipment, as 1required
by MARPOL of all vessels four hundred gross
29
tons or greater.
When the USCG officers reviewed the vessel's IOPP paperwork to see
if these deficiencies had been noted, they found a clean and unqualified
certificate issued by Pena a mere nineteen days before. Specifically,
Pena's April 15, 2010 IOPP certificate stated that he had surveyed the
vessel in accordance with MARPOL, and that he found the vessel's
equipment, including the oil filtering (15 ppm) equipment, to be
satisfactory and compliant with MARPOL. No mention was made in the
IOPP certificate of either the inoperable oily water separator, or the
presence of the makeshift system of pumps and tubes allowing discharge
of oily bilge water directly into the ocean.130 When questioned by
USCG authorities, Pena admitted that he had not actually tested the
oily water separator and that he had knowledge of the portable pumps
and tubes, but that he had authorized their use "only in an emergency."' 3 1 Pena was charged under the United States' Act to Prevent
Pollution from Ships (APPS)112 with an offense against the law of the
United States by conducting a survey that violated MARPOL protocol,

128. Id. at 1143-44. The certificate issued by Pena is commonly referred to as an
International Oil Pollution Prevention (IOPP) Certificate, and is required to be maintained
by the Master onboard a vessel in order to enter or set sail from the ports of MARPOL
signatory countries. Id. at 1142-43.
129. Id. at 1142-44 (citing Reg. 15.2, Resolution MEPC.117(52), Amendments to the
Annex of the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships, 1973, Oct. 15, 2004 (entered into force Jan. 1, 2007) (also known
as MARPOL Annex I)).
130. Id. at 1143-44.
131. Id. at 1144.
132. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1915 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
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and was found guilty in a jury trial conducted in33the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
On appeal, Pena argued that since MARPOL requires a vessel's flag
state to conduct surveys on vessels that fly its flag, only the flag state
(as opposed to the port state) enjoys jurisdiction to prosecute a surveyor
for failing to conduct a proper MARPOL survey."
The Eleventh
Circuit examined the APPS to determine whether there was such a limit
on exercise of subject matter jurisdiction.'35 The court first noted that
the APPS and its implementing regulations apply to MARPOL violations
occurring on foreign-flagged vessels only "'while [the ships are] in the
'
navigable waters of the United States. '""36
Since it was undisputed
that the violation at issue occurred while the vessel was in a Florida
port, this first limitation did not divest the district court of jurisdiction.'3 7 The second limitation on jurisdiction under the APPS states
that "[a]ny action taken under [the APPS] shall be taken in accordance
with international law."' 38 The court of appeals pointed out that
Article 4 of the MARPOL Convention clearly states that for violations
occurring within the jurisdiction of a port state, both the port state and
the flag state have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce MARPOL protocols.' 39 By signing on to the MARPOL treaty, the United States
consented to a surrender of exclusive jurisdiction over violations within
its ports, but it maintained concurrent jurisdiction to sanction violations
1 40
of MARPOL by foreign-flagged vessels within United States waters.
The court of appeals confirmed the district
court had subject matter
4
jurisdiction and upheld the conviction.1 '
XI.

SALVAGE

A.

Evidence of "MarinePeril"
Two cases involving the salvage of foundering vessels provided the
court of appeals with the occasion to clarify the standard in the Eleventh
Circuit for a "successful" salvage operation, and the requirements for an

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Pena, 684 F.3d at 1144.
Id. at 1144-45.
Id. at 1145.
Id. (alteration in original); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1902(aX2).
Pena, 684 F.3d at 1145.

138. Id. (alterations in original); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1912.
139.

Pena, 684 F.3d at 1146.

140. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2006); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1907-1908.
141. Pena, 684 F.3d at 1147, 1153.
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award of attorney fees to successful salvage litigants.14 2 The first case
of Reliable Salvage & Towing, Inc. v. Bivona 43 involved the rescue of
a thirty-five foot Sea Ray vessel owned by the defendant Michael Bivona
after it ran up onto a shoal near Boca Grande, Florida. The salvor
Reliable Salvage and Towing, Inc. (Reliable) found the vessel listing
thirty degrees in ten inches of water with a storm approaching and no
hope of tide action freeing the vessel for several days. Reliable
successfully towed the vessel to deeper water, for which Reliable billed
Bivona $7,523.10. After a dispute between Bivona and his insurer left
the invoice unpaid, Reliable filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida asserting an in personam claim against
Bivona (under a contract salvage theory) and an in rem claim against
the vessel (under a pure salvage theory).'"
The district court conducted a bench trial and awarded Reliable
$14,000 under a pure salvage theory for the services rendered in the
rescue of the Sea Ray vessel. The district court first determined that the
"contract" signed by Bivona was not enforceable as it was missing
essential terms, including the actual fee for the salvage.'
The district
court went on to hold that Reliable had successfully established at trial
the three elements of pure salvage-to wit, (1) the existence of a "marine
peril," (2) service voluntarily rendered by the salvor and not required as
an existing duty, and (3) success, in whole or in part, in saving the
vessel from the marine peril. 14 In addition to awarding Reliable the
principal amount of the pure salvage claim, the district court found that
the defense proffered by Bivona to the salvage claim at trial was
frivolous and in bad faith, awarded Reliable its attorney fees and costs
totaling $46,583.83.141
Bivona appealed the district court award arguing that he had
successfully defended against the contract salvage theory, and that
requiring Reliable to prove at trial the unliquidated amount of the "pure
salvage" it was seeking should not amount to bad faith or inequitable
conduct. 14 The court of appeals conducted a thorough review of the
record from the bench trial and determined that the defense put forth by

142. See Esoteric, LLC v. M/V Star One, 478 F. App'x 639 (11th Cir. 2012); Reliable
Salvage & Towing, Inc. v. Bivona, 476 F. App'x 852 (11th Cir. 2012).
143. 476 F. App'x 852 (11th Cir. 2012).

144. Id. at 853.
145. Id.
146. Id. (quoting Flagship Marine Servs., Inc. v. Belcher Towing, 966 F.2d 602, 605
(11th Cir. 1992)).

147. Id.
148. Id. at 853-54.
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Bivona was not well-founded in fact.149 His opening statement and
closing argument both asserted that the Sea Ray vessel had not been in
peril, despite the clear evidence of the approaching weather conditions50
the vessel would have faced were it not for Reliable's assistance.1
The court of appeals made further note of Bivona's testimony on the
stand conceding that Reliable had performed a service and "should be
entitled to payment," and that' he had an obligation to make such
payment, 151 all of which directly contradicts the earlier assertion that the
vessel had not been in peril. Lastly, the court of appeals pointed out
that Bivona never argued that the amount billed by Reliable was
unreasonable. 5 ' The award of attorney fees and costs to Reliable was
therefore affirmed. 53
B.

Element of "Successful Salvage"
The case of Esoteric, LLC v. M/V STAR ONE'54 was the second
salvage case to come before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and
involved issues very similar to the Reliable Salvage appeal, albeit with
a very different result.'5 5 The salvage situation in this case arose after
the yacht MN STAR ONE capsized near the Bahamas and was
discovered by the crew of another nearby yacht, the MN ESOTERIC.
The captain of the ESOTERIC determined that the submerged STAR
ONE constituted a navigational hazard due to its location in a busy sea
lane, and further noted that it could sustain additional damage if it were
to drift into nearby coral reefs. The ESOTERIC therefore put a line on
the STAR ONE and towed it to Bahamian waters, where local law
enforcement ordered the crew of the ESOTERIC to anchor the foundering vessel just outside the entrance to the harbor. A professional
salvage company took over at that point, and proceeded to right the
vessel, pump her dry, and tow her back to Miami. A second salvor then
towed the STAR ONE to a boatyard up the Miami River. The owners
and underwriters of the STAR ONE paid the two professional salvage
companies for their services in returning the vessel to Miami, but did not
compensate the ESOTERIC for its initial salvage efforts, so the owners

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 854.
Id.
Id. at 855.
Id.
Id.
478 F. App'x 639 (11th Cir. 2012).
See id.
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of the ESOTERIC filed suit in
the United States District Court for the
156
Southern District of Florida.
The primary issue litigated at the trial court level was whether
ESOTERIC had established the third element" 7 of a pure salvage
claim-"success" in saving, or in helping to save at least part of the
property at risk.15 The record from the bench trial below showed that
the STAR ONE had capsized and was at risk of sinking in 6,000 feet of
water when the ESOTERIC came upon the scene. The efforts of the
ESOTERIC ensured the safety of the STAR ONE by removing it from
the dangerous sea lane and depositing it anchored in waters thirty-five
feet deep, where it could be easily located for additional salvage efforts
to be undertaken. The trial court determined these efforts amounted to
a "successful" salvage, and awarded ESOTERIC a principal amount of
$67,800 for its voluntary salvage services. 59 Like the district court
in Reliable Salvage, the trial court in this matter went on to conclude
that the owners of the STAR ONE had "no basis for disputing [Esoteric's] salvage claim" because it had offered no evidence and had "no
cognizable defense at law" to counter the notion that the salvage efforts
of the ESOTERIC were successful, and thus awarded attorney fees in
the amount of $72,755. s
The primary dispute on appeal was not whether the salvage services
rendered by the ESOTERIC were in fact successful, but whether the
district court had erred in ruling that the owners of the STAR ONE had
failed to offer "any evidence" that the salvage efforts of the ESOTERIC
were unsuccessful."' The court of appeals began its analysis on this
issue by citing the general rule in admiralty cases that attorney fees are
not recoverable absent a showing that the losing party "'acted in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. ' 162 The STAR
ONE's owner had presented evidence in support of the defense that other
than being anchored, the condition of the STAR ONE remained
unchanged despite the purported salvage efforts by the ESOTERIC-namely, the vessel remained capsized, submerged, and at the same

156. Id. at 640-41.
157. The three elements of a pure salvage claim include (1) the existence of a "marine
peril," (2) service voluntarily rendered by the salvor and not required as an existing duty,
and (3) success, in whole or in part, in saving the vessel from the marine peril. Flagship
Marine Servs., Inc., 966 F.2d at 605.
158. Esoteric, 478 F. App'x at 641.
159. Id. at 641-42.
160. Id. at 643 (alteration in original).
161. Id.
162. Id. (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991)).
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level of risk of sinking as it had been before being towed by the
ESOTERIC.16 3
While this argument was not sufficient to reverse the district court's
ruling that the salvage efforts were a "success," the court of appeals
could not say such argument was "uncognizable" or constituted "an
abuse of the legal system." ' In reversing the grant of attorney fees,
the opinion closed with an admonition to district courts to "'resist the
understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning in concluding
that, because a [party] did not ultimately prevail,
his action must have
165
been unreasonable or without foundation.'

163. Id.
164. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
165. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.
412, 421-22 (1978)).

